



The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings

Jana Belschner

To cite this article: Jana Belschner (2018): The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, DOI: [10.1080/21565503.2018.1528163](https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1528163)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1528163>



© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 08 Nov 2018.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 2031



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 3 View citing articles [↗](#)

The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings

Jana Belschner 

Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

ABSTRACT

The adoption of electoral quotas for politically under-represented groups has become a prominent policy worldwide. An increasing number of states have adopted youth quotas, which aim to foster the election of young members of parliament under 35 to 40 years of age. To date, youth quotas only occur in tandem with simultaneously or previously adopted gender quotas. Why do states adopt youth quotas? Are the driving actors similar as in the adoption of gender quotas? Using causal process tracing based on a qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, and interviews, this article investigates the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco after the Arab uprisings in 2011. The findings suggest that, contrary to the respective gender quotas, youth quotas were not part of civil society movements' agendas, but top-down initiatives from actors from within the domestic political elites.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 9 April 2018
Accepted 19 September 2018

KEYWORDS

Political representation;
political participation;
women and gender; age;
Tunisia; Morocco

Introduction

The adoption of electoral quotas that aim to broaden and deepen the political representation of different identity groups has become a popular policy. Legislated gender quotas exist today in about 50 states worldwide. A more recent and regional trend is the adoption of legislated youth quotas. According to data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 2014/2015, legislated youth quotas are to date operational in eight countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 17). The quotas commonly define youth as those not older than 35 to 40 years of age. All states that have adopted youth quotas previously or simultaneously also adopted gender quotas and did so preferably during political transitions.

In general, the adoption of youth quotas is as puzzling as the adoption of gender quotas. First, youth form a considerable part of world populations but are under-represented in politics.¹ Hence, predominantly middle-aged legislators passed electoral quotas that may eventually unseat themselves. Second, youth's shared identity is non-permanent and a common interest in political representation may be more difficult to identify and to mobilize. Third, youth often lack societal resources and power, particularly in the "Global South" (Abbink 2005). It should hence be difficult for youth as a group to exert

CONTACT Jana Belschner  jana.belschner@uib.no  Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Christies gate 15, Bergen 5020, Norway

© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

pressure for the adoption of electoral quotas. Therefore, why do states adopt youth quotas? Gender and politics research has identified three kinds of actors driving quota adoption: Women groups and movements mobilizing bottom-up for better representation, international actors diffusing norms favorable to the political inclusion of women, and domestic political elites pursuing strategic goals and initiating quotas top-down (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Krook 2004, 2007). Particularly in authoritarian and hybrid settings, studies have emphasized the strategic value of gender quotas for regime stabilization and legitimization (Muriaas and Wang 2012; Welbourne 2010). This article engages with this literature by asking if the same actors and dynamics behind youth quota adoption can be identified.

It presents the results from a comparative case study of gender and youth quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco based on the qualitative analysis of newspaper articles and social media data, law texts, and interviews, complemented by quantitative survey data. The article aims to explain why two substantially different regimes – the Moroccan monarchy and the post-revolution Tunisian Republic – both decided to adopt youth quotas after the Arab uprisings in 2011. This is a puzzle in itself, since Morocco is usually framed as part of the “monarchical exception” during the Arab uprisings. Several studies find that all of the Arab monarchies – Jordan, Morocco, and the GCC states – managed to mitigate the impact of the uprisings and largely achieved to maintain the status quo, while the republics – Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – experienced full-blown revolutions and regime changes (Barari 2015; Lucas 2014; Yom and Gause 2012). Indeed, Morocco adopted the youth quotas in the course of minor constitutional revisions within 6 months after the uprisings, while Tunisia came to this decision after a three-year long process of constitution writing and the designing of a new post-revolution political system. Considering that both the regimes types and the scope of the transitions differ substantially, a comparison of these two cases thus allows exploring potentially different paths and motivations to similar policy choices.

The findings suggest that there were no public demands for a youth quota from the broader youth movements in either country. In Tunisia, a group of deputies in the constitutional assembly initiated the introduction of a youth quota during the compilation of the electoral code in the last phase of the immediate transition process. In Morocco, the King Mohammed VI suggested introducing a youth quota as a reaction to publicly raised demands by youth members of political parties. I argue that both initiatives should be understood as efforts of legitimization and stabilization after the uprisings, albeit with different focuses.

The article unfolds as follows: The first section maps youth quotas and the structural conditions for their adoption. The next section presents theoretical arguments for the introduction of electoral quotas that mainly derive from gender and politics research. I then transfer those theories to youth quota adoption in the form of hypotheses on actors, strategies, and motivations potentially driving youth quota adoption. It follows the process-tracing analysis of youth quota adoption and a comparative discussion of the findings. The conclusion qualifies the study’s findings and the scope of my argument.

Mapping youth quotas

Youth worldwide are practically absent from formal politics, considering that only 14% of the world’s Members of Parliament (MPs) are aged under forty (Inter-Parliamentary

Union 2016). Table 1 lists the states that have so far adopted legislated youth quotas to counter this under-representation. Seven of them are African states; with a regional focus on East and North Africa. The neighboring states of Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya were at the forefront of adopting youth quotas; and they all did so in the aftermath of conflict and the following (re-)writing of constitutions. A second important wave of youth quota adoption was apparently triggered by the youth-led uprisings in North Africa in 2011, when Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt all introduced youth quotas in their revisited constitutions. However, it is noticeable that other Arab countries that experienced uprisings in 2011 – Libya, Syria, Jordan, and the GCC countries – did not make this policy decision.

The Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) index for liberal democracy in the respective year of quota adoption shows that youth quotas have mostly been adopted by semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes. However, governments tend to introduce them in post-conflict periods that may in some cases be framed as democratization processes – indicated by a positive change in the V-Dem index two years after quota adoption. The dynamics of political transition have been shown to be particularly favorable for the adoption of electoral quotas, for example by initiating a process of constitutional revision and the creation of new electoral laws (Anderson and Swiss 2014; Hughes 2009; Tajali 2013).

All of the states listed in Table 1 have previously or simultaneously also adopted gender quotas. Both legislated youth and gender quotas occur either as candidate quotas (LC) that regulate the targeted groups' share on electoral lists, or as reserved seats (RS), for which these groups compete in separate elections. Most quotas define an age limit of 35 to 40 years. This reflects a particular understanding of “youth” when it comes to political representation. Many United Nations Bodies define youth as aged 15–24, but since young people rarely gain office before the age of 35, an age threshold of 40–45 years has become common in defining MPs as young (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 5). The last column in Table 1 indicates (potentially eligible) youth's share in population and in parliament. It shows that all the countries in question have high proportions of citizens aged 20–39, a phenomenon that has been coined the African “youth bulge”. Broader statistical analyses of the relationship between demographics and youth representation have found no significant correlation between a young median age and youth representation (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 16). However, as the second part of this column

Table 1. Countries with legislated youth quotas on the national level.

Country	YQ adoption	V-Dem index t_0	Change V-Dem index ($\Delta t_1 t_0$)	Youth quota	Age limit	Youth (20–39y.) in population /parliament ^a
Egypt	2014	0.10	+/-0.0	13% LC	n.d.	34% / n.d.
Gabon	2015	0.25	+0.01	20% LC	40	31% / 9%
Kenya	2010	0.36	-0.01	3–4% RS	35	32% / n.d.
Kyrgyzstan	2010	0.23	+0.08	15% LC	35	35% / 35%
Morocco	2011	0.24	+/-0.0	8% RS	40	34% / 18%
Rwanda	2003	0.14	+0.02	8% RS	35	32% / 22%
Tunisia	2014	0.63	+0.03	25% LC	35	32% / 23%
Uganda	1995	0.24	+0.01	1% RS	30	30% / 22%

Note: t_0 : Year of quota adoption; t_1 : 2 years after quota adoption.

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016; V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (from 0.0 – least democratic to 1.0 – most democratic); see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>; World Bank.

^aworld average: 31% / 14%.

shows, most countries with legislated youth quotas do exhibit higher youth representation in parliament than the world average, although the quotas usually still fall short to mirror accurately the high proportions of youth populations.

Actors driving youth quota adoption

How, then, do those structural conditions – demography, exposure to international pressure, and dynamics of transformation – translate into facilitating the adoption of youth quotas? Research engaging with the dynamics behind gender quota adoption has argued that quotas need to be actively lobbied for and identified three main groups of key actors driving gender quota adoption: civil society movements, international actors, and domestic political elites (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Krook 2004). This is particularly relevant for countries in political transition processes. Whereas electoral reform is typically the prerogative of governments, political transitions open distinct spaces of opportunity for a variety of actors outside formal politics to push for electoral reform (Arendt 2018; Bauer and Burnet 2013; Muriaas, Tønnessen, and Wang 2013). In general, newly emerging institutions should be understood as the outcome of strategic interactions of key actors during transformation processes (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 5). Since we lack theoretical and empirical accounts of youth quota adoption (for an exception see Trantidis 2016), I suggest transferring assumptions on gender quota adoption to youth quotas, asking if we can identify similar patterns of actors, strategies, and motivations.

The first account puts emphasis on identity groups and movements, who may mobilize to claim representational guarantees bottom-up. With regard to the Arab uprisings, Asseburg and Wimmen have coined the term “mobilized public”, which they define as to “include any collective of citizens that becomes active and mobilizes others to do so with the explicit objective of exerting [...] influence on the political process” (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9). Youth quota adoption may thus be linked to youth groups and movements who claim political inclusion and representation. In terms of strategies, identity groups will usually opt for visible public action and civil society mobilization in order to obtain broad support, and hence leverage, for their claims (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9). The building of alliances between (parts of) identity groups and political elites as well as with international actors is also a suitable strategy. Regarding their motivation and argumentation, proponents for youth quotas commonly refer to a narrative of generational justice. Youth quotas are thus seen as a means to foster youth’s *collective* representation rather than to counter *individual* discrimination (Reyes 2015; Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen 2015). In Tunisia and Morocco, youth were an important part of the mobilized publics that drove the Arab uprisings, as well as a considerable part of the population as a whole. The first hypothesis is:

H1: Youth movements publicly sought better political representation of young citizens and mobilized for the introduction of youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco.

Second, international actors and donors may support and encourage youth quota adoption. There is a growing international interest in the political inclusion and representation of youth, motivated by the belief that a better mirroring of young voters in parliament may for instance encourage them to participate more actively in politics (European

Commission and UNDP 2017). The inclusion of youth into parliaments is also promoted to change a state's political culture, render political institutions more inclusive, and strengthen democratization (UNDP 2013). In terms of strategies, international donors primarily rely on the issuing of declarations, making recommendations, and sharing of good practices, i.e. norm diffusion. Particularly during and after the Arab uprisings, international actors and donors were present both as consultants in the processes of constitution writing and as project partners for local NGOs and had considerable influence on the outcome of the respective transformation processes.

H2: International actors issued recommendations and/or supported domestic claims for the introduction of youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco.

Finally, youth quotas may as well have been initiated top-down by domestic political elites. For the purpose of this article, I use political elites as a conceptual category comprising a multitude of actors with potentially differing and even conflicting interests, but united by their capacity to directly influence policy-formulation and adoption. For example, governments, political parties, and deputies in legislative bodies are conceptualized as belonging to the political elites.² Actors in that category may not just react to claims for quotas raised by identity groups or international actors, i.e. bottom-up, but also have reason to initiate youth quota adoption themselves, i.e. top-down. As the idea of political elites encouraging reforms that may unseat themselves is quite counter-intuitive, most of the literature assumes that their motivation to do so is based on strategic cost-benefit calculations which can render quota adoption attractive to them (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011). This is particularly relevant considering that most of the countries with legislated youth quotas are authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

I argue that the adoption of youth quotas may serve two main strategic purposes: Legitimization and stabilization (Gerschewski 2013). On the one hand, youth quotas may be a means to win the political support of the domestic youth population. Youth represent a considerable share of the electorate in the countries in question and are thus an important audience both for single political actors, e.g. parties, as well as for a regime as such. As Murphy (2012, 14) describes, Arab regimes have reacted to the demographic youth bulge and youth's self-removal from politics – both as voters and as members of political parties – with attempts to reintegrate youth into their national projects by proactive efforts to reach out to them. Youth quotas could thus be understood as one of those efforts. Furthermore, considering international actors and donors' positive attitudes towards quota policies, the political elites may also seek legitimacy from those actors. Related to legitimacy-seeking efforts is a concern with political stability. Considering that youth are involved to important degrees in opposition politics, labor unions, and student movements (Abbink 2005, 13), youth quotas could be inspired by the idea that guaranteeing youth a voice in conventional politics will dampen their urge to revolt. Increasing youth's share in parliament may as well be an effective way to co-opt potential opposition groups and maintain control over rivals (Baldez 2003), a logic that Murphy (2012, 6) describes as “fencing” youthful population in formal – and restrictive – political structures. Accordingly, this is the third hypothesis to be tested:

H3: Actors from the domestic political elites initiated the youth quotas in Tunisia and/or Morocco with an interest in regime legitimization and stabilization.

Case selection, methods, and data

Both Tunisia and Morocco experienced political turmoil and (partial) democratization in spring 2011 and subsequently introduced youth and gender quotas. Although the cases do thus not vary on the dependent variable, they do vary considerably in terms of the nature and outcomes of the respective transitions, as well as with regard to regime type. Whereas Tunisia experienced a complete regime change followed by a profound democratization process, the Moroccan king could comparatively quickly stem the uprisings by conceding minor constitutional revisions that did not substantively challenge the monarchy. The research design is therefore based on most different systems – similar outcome approach. It employs a comparative case study approach, which allows to focus on actors, motivations, and logics of acting to trace how structural conditions may translate into specific opportunity structures. A structured and focused comparison of Tunisia and Morocco can yield useful insights into the dynamics of regime persistence and change that are related to electoral reform and quota policies.

The study employs causal process tracing to investigate the actors and factors driving youth quota adoption. Causal process tracing is a suitable method in this respect, as it aims to measure and test competing hypothesized causal mechanisms to make inferences about the causal explanations of a case (Bennett and Checkel 2015). The study relies on data from a qualitative content analysis of the relevant Tunisian and Moroccan law texts (constitutions, constitutional drafts, and electoral codes), 460 newspaper articles on youth and gender quotas,³ and interview and social media data in the Tunisian case – complemented by quantitative survey data regarding overall attitudes in the youth population. The data was coded qualitatively to capture the point in time when demands for gender and youth quotas were firstly raised, which actors did so, and how they proceeded their demands. As Asseburg and Wimmen (2016, 11) suggest, the analysis focuses on the examination of crucial turning points in the post-uprising period, since calculations and priorities of actors are likely to become most apparent then.

Tunisia: The complementary youth quota

The self-immolation of the Tunisian citizen Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 triggered the Arab uprisings. Tunisia subsequently embarked on a profound transition process that can be divided into three sub-phases: (Pre-)election of the Constitutional Assembly (January to October 2011), Constitution writing (October 2011 to January 2014), and the compilation of the electoral code (January to October 2014).

The first phase is the transition from revolution to the election of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA). During this phase, the Higher Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (HIROR) was responsible for the compilation of an interim electoral code. The Tunisian women's movement then became a visible and influential part of the post-revolution public (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). Through networks and contacts to the domestic political elites and to international organizations, feminist movements were granted a voice on HIROR. Side by side with other secular forces that dominated the commission, they achieved the adoption of gender parity as one of three basic principles in the interim electoral code for the upcoming elections of the NCA (Zemni 2015) – although only 55% of female and 37% of male

Tunisians were in favor of parity (Le Temps/El Menzah, May 5 2011). Art. 16 of the decree law (République Tunisienne 2011) clarifies that lists that don't respect gender parity (i.e. a 50% share of candidacies for each gender) and alternating placement of men and women on the lists will be rejected. There is also a vague provision for youth representation: Art. 33 states that "every list ensures that [at least one of] their candidates [...] is younger than 30 years old." No sanctioning mechanism was attached to this provision.

Whereas HIROR was dominated by secular actors and Tunis-based elites, the young, often unemployed and marginalized men who had been important drivers behind the Tunisian revolution, had nearly disappeared from the political scene. Studies investigating the post-revolution engagement of protestors characterize it as taking place outside civil society and political party organizations, concentrated on the local context, and poorly informed (Allal 2011; Allal and Geisser 2011; Korany and El Sayyad 2017). As Collins (2011, 5) describes, young Tunisians, in general, were wary about the political process and the role of the current élite, including the mainly Tunis-based youth organizations which were perceived as elitist themselves and not representative of the youth who effectuated the revolution (see also The Carter Center 2014, 9). Just before the elections in October 2011, only 38% of Tunisian youth aged 18–24 correctly identified its purpose: to choose an assembly that would write the new constitution (Hoffman and Jamal 2012, 172).

The second phase of transition, constitution writing, lasted nearly three years. The Islamist party *Ennahdha* won the elections in October 2011 and formed a so-called Troika-government with two smaller secular parties. The political representation and participation of women became one of the most debated issues (Charrad and Zarrugh 2014). Table A2 (see Appendix 3) summarizes propositions in all constitutional drafts relating to women and youth's political representation. The first draft issued in August 2012 clearly was the most conservative concerning women's rights, evoking the notion of the genders as "complementary" instead of equal. Women's movements, supported by domestic NGOs, led massive demonstrations against complementarity and *Ennahdha* in general, culminating on the Tunisian Women's Day (August 8 2012). The domestic and international environment subsequently became unfavorable for *Ennahdha*, and the notion of complementarity disappeared from all following constitutional drafts, which began carrying the signature of a growingly influential civil society (Netterstrøm 2015). International actors and donors explicitly expressed their support for gender parity. The European Union and its sub-organizations,⁴ single countries such as the US,⁵ Germany,⁶ and South Africa,⁷ international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program and UN Women⁸ and global NGOs such as Amnesty International⁹ all voiced explicit support for parity rules during the process of constitution writing. On January 9 2014, after heated debates, article 46 and the parity-paragraph were adopted by a majority of 127 "yes" votes in the Constitutional Assembly.

No such public support by international actors can be found for the introduction of a youth quota or even for a general promotion of youth political participation. Youth as a marginalized group in politics were also literally absent from the domestic debate on political representation. Although their role in "building the nation" was mentioned by constitutional drafts (see Table A2), the provisions concerning their political involvement and representation were both more limited in scope and vaguer concerning the degree of the state's responsibility in comparison with the regulations concerning women. There was a

strong tendency to view youth as a disadvantaged group that needed education, guidance, and most of the all, employment, more than political involvement.

M. Al Barazanji [head of a Tunisian NGO, author] insists on the embedment and orientation of youth so that they become more able to face the challenges of democracy. (AllAfrica.com, July 23 2011)

Unlike for the women's movement, there is no evidence that youth, at any point during the constitutional process, raised demands for an electoral quota. Whereas there are 146 references in newspaper articles and law texts concerning the gender quota, there are only 27 related to youth's political representation. One of them describes the results of a workshop of local youth associations of the Northern and North-Eastern parts of the country.

The youth active in civil society insisted on the fact that they are not depoliticized, but that they wish an institutional renewal of politics [...]. Petitions, the accession to associations and political parties, voting, and standing for elections are supported. Specifically, the youth suggested actions aiming at youth's mobilization to participate in elections, both as voters and candidates. (Le Temps/El Menzah January 2 2013)

It is noticeable that the youth associations do not claim a quota or representational guarantees for youth, although they recognize the importance of youth's presence among the candidates for elections. At this point in time, youth activists and NGOs in general focused on a claim for employment and the improvement of their socio-economic situation (Collins 2011). As youth activists stated in interviews, "we cannot talk about youth participation when basic needs are not provided – income, employment, social status" (Boubakri and Bouzidi 2017). It is noticeable that the constitutional text only mentions youth from the third draft on. To guarantee their political representation – restricted to local councils – is the only constitutional provision concerning youth's involvement in formal politics. As Moncef Al Charni, one of the few young deputies in the NCA, asserted during a plenary session on July 2 2013: "Not enough attention has been paid to youth in this constitutional project" (Majles ANC 2013). On January 4 2014, a constitutional amendment to Article 8 stipulating "youth's integration and representation in professional, political, and decision-making bodies shall be facilitated" was rejected, mainly by the votes of Ennahdha. It had been suggested by Nadia Châabane, a (middle-aged female) deputy from the opposition.

After the adoption of the final constitutional text, the third transitional phase started. A new electoral code, based on the principles the constitution had laid down, had to be written and adopted by the NCA. Only now was a youth quota concretely debated, mainly with reference to Art. 8 of the Constitution. The Tunisian NGO Al Bawsala as well as single deputies twittered statements and results from debates inside the respective commissions.¹⁰ Table 2 lists those interventions.

Youth's political representation in general, and a possible quota in particular, has been discussed in 5 inner-commission debates between February and April 2014, before a final version was voted on in the last plenary debate on this subject the end of April 2014. As Table 2 illustrates, a rather small group of deputies regularly recalled the subject and argued for the adoption of some form of youth quota. Most of them belonged to government parties, particularly to Ennahdha. Interestingly, the majority of them are middle-aged. According to the arguments revealed in the tweets, the quota shall serve to

Table 2. Debates and interventions on the youth quota in the Tunisian constitutional assembly.

Date	Location of debate	Intervening deputies ^(a)	Intervention
13.2.14	Commission for general legislation	Imen Ben Mohamed (gvt., 30) Soulef Ksantini (gvt., 45) Mongi Rahoui (opp., 50) Salha Ben Aicha (gvt., 41) Selim Ben Abdessalem (gvt., 44)	Recalls youth's representation in elections Recalls youth's representation on electoral lists Declares that the youth need to be targeted by a quota Declares that the first three candidates on each list should be youth of about 30 years of age Suggests that, to guarantee youth's inclusion, a limit for the average age of the first three candidates on a list should be calculated
19.2.14	Commission for general legislation	Najla Bouriel (opp., 44) Hanan Sassi (opp., 34) Tahar Ilahi (opp., 45) Imen Ben Mohamed (gvt., 30)	Speaks out for youth's representativeness on electoral lists, and the establishment of a quota Argues for the representation of youth and horizontal parity Advocates for more flexibility concerning youth representation on electoral lists, demanding that 0.5 of the first three candidates should be youth Suggests to offer financial incentives for the lists that achieve to nominate an important share of youth
10.3.14	Commission for rights and freedoms	Mahmoud Gouiaa (gvt., 49) Mahmoud Gouia (gvt., 49) Sonia Toumia (gvt., 38)	Suggests a postponement of the issue of the youth quota Considers that the youth interested in public affairs are in the process of receding from the political parties Argues that a youth quota would need a placement mandate (at least third position); if not they will be placed at the bottom of lists
26.3.14	Plenary debate	A citizen Samir Ben Amor (gvt., 46) Karim Krifa (opp., 41)	Asks about youth's representativeness on electoral lists Declares that youth are still reluctant towards political action and that they need more experience. Declares also that the envisaged electoral law must be adequate to the constitution's provisions. Answers that for the youth, there will be rule that guarantees their presence on electoral lists.
19.4.14	Consensus committee on the electoral law	Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41) Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41)	The parties have to be obliged to place at least one youth among the first three candidates on the electoral lists, in order to maximize their chances for being elected. The refusal to add an amendment on youth's representativeness is in my opinion anti-constitutional (art. 8 of the constitution)
29.4.14	Plenary debate	Lobna Jeribi (gvt., 41)	Consensus now: at least 1 youth under the age of 35 among the first 4 on the electoral lists (instead of the first 3, our suggestion)

Source: Twitter Accounts of AlBawsala, Lobna Jeribi, Nadia Châabane.

^agvt: government; opp: opposition; age of the deputy in parentheses.

“guarantee youth’s inclusion” and to counter their tendency to recede from the political parties. Furthermore, the deputies argue that a quota which aims at maximizing youth’s chances for being elected would need a placement mandate to prevent political parties of placing them at the bottom of electoral lists. Since the constitutional provision on youth’s political representation is weaker than the one regarding women, the deputies are divided on the interpretation of the constitution. While Lobna Jeribi, a proponent of the quota, argues that “the refusal to add an amendment on youth’s representativeness is in my opinion anti-constitutional”, Samir Ben Amor requests against the introduction of a youth quota that “the envisaged electoral law must be adequate to the constitution’s provisions”. Furthermore, he contends that youth need more political experience, before they can be regarded as candidates.

Concerning the design of a possible youth quota, several different propositions were discussed both in the commissions and in the final plenary debate for the adoption of the electoral law. They varied from the obligation to have at least one youth in the first half of the electoral list to the adoption of a RS quota (Majles ANC 2014). The social democratic party Ettakatol, part of the ruling coalition, had suggested to guarantee the presence of one youth within the first three list positions. Eventually, this quota was voted to apply to the first four list positions, which had to contain at least one candidate under 35 years. The quota was enforced with a financial sanction which deprives lists of 50% of their state funding in case of noncompliance with the youth quota (République Tunisienne 2014, Art.25). Gender parity, on the other hand, was adopted in the same form that had been valid for the last elections: It requires a 50% share and alternating placement for both genders on electoral lists, which are rejected in cases of noncompliance (République Tunisienne 2014, Art.24).

Morocco: The co-opted youth quota

As with Tunisia, Morocco has experienced a transition process since the Arab spring, although comparatively swift and with differing outcomes. Inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Moroccan youth started a series of protests in February 2011. Joined by human rights organizations, NGOs, and unions, the protestors demanded constitutional reforms, but explicitly did not call for a removal of the monarchy (Thyen 2017). The king reacted quickly, announcing in a speech on March 9 2011, the forming of an expert commission comprising political parties’ and civil society representatives to revise the Moroccan constitution. In this speech, he explicitly addressed three groups that could potentially threaten his rule: the political parties, trade unions, and “our ambitious youth” (Thyen 2017, 333). This commission introduced several middle-ranged political reforms, which were directed at a clearer separation of the king’s and the government’s competences.

The revised constitution also scrutinizes the political participation of both women and youth, with slightly different accents, however (Royaume du Maroc 2011a). Article 19 states: “The Moroccan State shall work to realize parity between men and women.” Article 30 concretizes that provision, stating that “[...] the law provides provisions to promote the equal access of women and men to elective functions.” The provisions concerning youth’s political involvement are weaker and less extensive than the articles on women’s participation. Article 33 of the constitution stipulates that the public authorities

shall take measures to “[...] extend and generalize youth’s participation in social, economic, cultural, and political development [...]”

A popular referendum on July 1 2011, approved the new constitution. Subsequently, the parliament drafted a new electoral law establishing a system of tandem quotas, which reserves sixty seats for women and thirty seats for male¹¹ candidates under 40 years of age in the Moroccan House of Representatives (Royaume du Maroc 2011b, Art. 23). The law thereby codified and amplified a “gentlemen’s agreement” between the Moroccan parties, who had reserved thirty seats for women elected on one national list composed of only women candidates since 2002. Several studies have thoroughly traced the adoption and implementation of Morocco’s subsequent forms of gender quotas, finding that the main actors pressuring for the adoption of a codified gender quota law in 2011 were women’s organizations (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013; Sater 2012). They joined forces with the King Mohammed VI, who promoted the inclusion of women into the political system as part of an agenda oriented towards international standards of modernity and democraticness (Desrues and Kirhlani 2010). None of these studies elaborates more on the Moroccan youth quota, though. Although a broad literature on Moroccan youth’s activism before and during the Arab spring does exist (Desrues 2012; Hegasy 2007; Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016), youth are primarily seen as activists outside the political sphere and the youth quota is seldom scrutinized.

The Moroccan youth movement was indeed distinct and well organized. They named themselves the “20th February movement”. A list with the claims of the movement was published on March 13 2011, and focuses on better access to social services, the reduction of graduate unemployment, and the necessity for political reforms (Desrues 2012, 32). There was no mention of youth’s exclusion from power, nor a claim for electoral guarantees.

Demands to include a youth quota in the new electoral law were first raised in late summer 2011, after the constitution had been adopted and come into operation, but before the compilation of the electoral law. On August 20 2011, in his speech for the 58th anniversary of the “Revolution of the King and the People”, the king announced:

Our major asset [...] consists in the creative dynamic of our youth [...]. It is important that the political parties give youth and women a chance in order to promote the emergence of qualified elites, capable of bringing new blood into politics and the constitutional institutions. (Mohammed VI 2011)

Just one day later, these demands of the king were echoed and concretized by youth members of political parties. A newspaper article from August 21 2011, notes that

Youth organizations have called for the establishment of a youth quota on the electoral lists for the legislative elections anticipated for the 25th November, to contribute to the rejuvenation of the political class in Morocco [...]. This call was launched by fourteen youth sections of political parties (majority and opposition) during a meeting in Rabat. (L’Orient le Jour, August 21 2011)

Interestingly, the king had called for a better representation of women and youth already before 2011. In his throne speech in 2003, he had rhetorically asked

But what can be the power of parties if they do not assume their role of representing citizens, and youth in particular, and if they do not contribute to the fortification of the authority of the State and to a climate of trust towards its institutions? (Mohammed VI 2003)

The king had thus positioned himself above conventional (party) politics, which made him a credible ally for young party members' claims to help them circumvent disadvantageous political party structures (González and Desrues 2018).

Taming the unruly: The strategic adoption of youth quotas

As the comparison of quota adoption processes within and across cases has demonstrated, there are important differences between youth and gender quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco. Both gender quotas were actively demanded by domestic women's movements and civil society organizations and framed with reference to the originally French concept of "parity."¹² In Tunisia, civil society's primary ally were international actors that accompanied the process of constitution writing and intervened with surprisingly open statements in favor of parity. In Morocco, women's organizations and women in political parties sought the king's solidarity and made him a speaker for their demands. Arguably, the gender quotas in neither country would have come about without the pressure of the domestic women's movements that achieved to build strong alliances to international actors in Tunisia and to the king in Morocco.

Concerning the question why youth quotas were adopted additional to the gender quotas, I could not find convincing evidence for the hypothesis H1 that youth movements had mobilized for the adoption of an electoral quota. Despite the background of youth-led protests that engendered the subsequent (partial) democratization processes and although political reforms were part of youth activists' agendas in both countries, no explicit requests for a youth quota were voiced. As survey data collected by the Arab barometer in 2011 indicates, the main reasons for Tunisian youth to having participated in the protests were "demands for improving the economic situation" (most or second important reason for 77% of protestors), followed by "combating corruption" (most or second important reason for 60%) and eventually "demands for civil and political freedom" (most or second important reason for 50%) (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 4). Accordingly, as Collins has found in focus group interviews with Tunisian youth in 2011, priority areas identified by youth for the post-revolution period were corruption and unemployment, rather than constitutional reform (Collins 2011, 11). In line with those structural conditions, neither in the direct aftermath of the revolution, nor during the long phase of constitution writing, did mobilized youth and/or youth organizations publicly voice the demand for a youth quota in the explicit way that women's organizations did for a gender quota.

In Morocco, on the other hand, demands for a quota were publicly raised by a group of youth. However, it was a limited circle of members from the youth wings of political parties, who should rather be framed as part of the domestic political elites. This is also supported by the fact that youth from all Moroccan parties – government and opposition – voiced this claim together. Again, the youth who had mobilized during the 2011 uprisings had focused on economic demands and not on specific representational guarantees (Lucas 2014, 197). Furthermore, the 20th February movement had quickly been marginalized during the process of constitutional revision due to what many authors describe as an appropriation and reframing of the reform process by the Moroccan king (Thyen 2017, 335). The adoption of the Moroccan youth quota can be seen as part of this strategy.

The study's findings suggest that actors who can be categorized as belonging to the domestic political elites were at the origin of youth quotas in both countries (H3 confirmed). In Tunisia, deputies in the Constitutional Assembly, both from government and opposition parties, evoked the introduction of a youth quota first during the third phase of the transitional processes, after the adoption of the constitution and during the compilation of the electoral code. During the debates, arguments focused on the necessity to grant youth political inclusion and representation, as well as to enable them to circumvent disadvantageous recruitment structures within the political parties. A former member of the CA stated in an interview: "They did the revolution, they deserve political inclusion." At the same time, she points to youth's destabilizing potential: "The youth are dangerous [...] they can 'explode'. States have always been afraid of that social category" (Interview 8, Nov. 2017, Tunis). Youth activists and policy consultants, on the other hand, hint to the importance of international norms and pressures: "I don't have the impression that the deputies introduced the youth quota out of conviction, but mainly to satisfy some international partners" (Interview 1, Oct 2017, Tunis). Additionally, they assume that the elites may have seen the strategic and symbolic value of a youth quota and its potentially legitimizing function: "It is also a way to say 'voilà, it's the youth's revolution, we shouldn't be ungrateful to them' ... it is a symbolic policy" (Interview 3, Oct 2017, Tunis). I therefore argue that the Tunisian youth quota addressed both the domestic population and the international community and was mainly intended to legitimize and stabilize the new democratic political system – both domestically and internationally. In this sense, international recommendations and norms, although not voiced as explicitly as in the case of the Tunisian gender quota, may also have been a secondary influence factor for the adoption of the Tunisian youth quota (H2 partly confirmed for Tunisia). This is in line with other studies' findings that the Tunisian constitution making process in general was heavily influenced by international experts (The Carter Center 2014, 6–7).

In Morocco, the King Mohammed VI was an important driving force behind the youth quota and a powerful ally for the group of politically engaged youth that eventually demanded the quota. The electoral reform seemed beneficial for both sides. While it facilitated youth's access into political power, circumventing disadvantageous party structures, it also allowed the king to co-opt an influential and, at this point in time, potentially dangerous group into the political system. He had frequently addressed youth as a group in his throne speeches and was highly aware of their potential to threaten his rule. The youth quota was adopted by adding RS to the parliament, which potentially empowers supporters of the king – the youth members of political parties who are in general not opposed to the monarchy, but "part of the game" themselves – within the legislature and the political parties. This shows that the adoption of youth quotas in Morocco is in line with the king's overall policy goal of legitimizing and stabilizing the autocratic status quo after the uprisings. As described by Barari (2015, 103), the king sought to take the momentum away from protesters by placing himself at the forefront of political reform and to outmaneuver the opposition by offering limited and managed concessions. This strategy, in contrast to the Tunisian case, was directed much more towards a domestic than an international audience (H2 disconfirmed for Morocco). In summary, the policy choice of introducing electoral quotas for youth had proved similarly attractive to a newly democratized and an enduring autocratic regime – albeit for different reasons.

Conclusion

This article has investigated the relatively new policy of electoral youth quotas. It has shown that legislated youth quotas to date have been mainly adopted by hybrid or authoritarian regimes with high proportions of youth in their population; preferably in contexts of political transitions and always additional to previously or simultaneously adopted gender quotas. Asking which actors drove youth quota adoption in Tunisia and Morocco, the article has found that the youth quotas were initiatives of the domestic political elites in both countries. Both the new Tunisian Republic and the autocratic Moroccan monarchy employed the youth quotas as part of their legitimacy-seeking and stabilization-oriented policies – although with reversed algebraic signs. While the adoption of the Tunisian youth quota was seen as a way to demonstrate the new regime’s commitment to domestic and international norms of democracy and inclusion, the Moroccan quota was part of the king’s strategy to legitimize and stabilize the autocratic status quo. The processes leading to the adoption of youth quotas thus confirm other studies’ findings on policy choices of post Arab-spring regimes, where political elites attempted to “use mobilized publics to generate evidence of popular legitimacy for themselves and their agendas” (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016, 9).

By unpacking the processes and identifying the mechanisms that have led to similar policy choices in two quite different regimes, the article has shed light on the conditions under which elites may be willing to cede power to groups – even if those are not publicly demanding it. The article thus adds to the literature on the strategic value of electoral policies, particularly in regimes facing political transition processes, as well as on the literature investigating the dynamics emanating from the so-called Arab spring uprisings in 2011 (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016; Barari 2015; Welbourne 2010).

This study is among the first to empirically analyze the adoption of electoral youth quotas. It has to be said that it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate or judge the effectiveness of either gender or youth quotas regarding women and youth political representation, or, even less, their positive or negative impact on democratization. However, the fact that political elites seem to have mainly seen the symbolic importance of youth quotas and may have less interest in youth’s substantive representation certainly encourages further inquiries into youth quotas’ differential designs and impacts.

Notes

1. People between the ages of 20 and 44 make up 57% of the world’s voting age population but only 26% of the world’s MPs (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 3).
2. I here follow the concept of ‘politically relevant elites’ (PRE) established by Perthes (2004, 5).
3. Tunisia: 340 newspaper articles on gender quota, 89 newspaper articles on youth quota adoption. Morocco: 31 articles on youth quota adoption. I limited the analysis to articles that appeared between 11/01/01 and 14/12/31 (Tunisia) and, respectively, 11/12/31 (Morocco; see Appendix 1). As the content analysis led to inconclusive results for the adoption of the youth quota in Tunisia, I complemented the data with evidence from Twitter as well as with eight in-depth interviews (see Appendices 1 and 2).
4. *Le Temps/El Menzah*, September 15 2011.
5. AllAfrica.com, May 6 2011.
6. AllAfrica.com, June 29 2011.
7. AllAfrica.com, June 26 2011.

8. Le Temps/El Menzah, June 21 2011.
9. AllAfrica.com, December 11 2011.
10. See more information on the Twitter evidence in appendix A.
11. This has changed: Since 2016, at least one person of each gender must be represented within the seats reserved for youth.
12. For a discussion of the parity concept and its normative foundations see (Bereni 2007).

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful for all comments received on previous versions of this paper. Particular thanks go to the anonymous reviewers, the supervisors of my doctoral thesis Ragnhild Louise Muriaas and Lars Svåsand and to my discussants at the 2017 ECPG conference and the 2018 workshop in Lund, Ana Espirito-Santo, Karen Celis, and Drude Dahlerup. I also owe special thanks to my PhD fellows who provided helpful comments and suggestions during the 2017 Solstrand seminar.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the Norwegian Research Council under grant number 250669/F10.

ORCID

Jana Belschner  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4534-7951>

References

- Abbink, J. 2005. "Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal." In *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and Conflict in Africa*, edited by J. Abbink and I. van Kessel, 1–36. Leiden: Brill.
- Allal, A. 2011. "Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier !: Germes d'un passage au politique de jeunes hommes de quartiers populaires lors du moment révolutionnaire à Tunis." *Politique Africaine* 121 (1): 53–67.
- Allal, A., and V. Geisser. 2011. "La Tunisie de l'après-Ben Ali: Les partis politiques à la recherche du 'peuple introuvable'." *Cultures & Conflits* 83, December: 118–125.
- Anderson, M. J., and L. Swiss. 2014. "Peace Accords and the Adoption of Electoral Quotas for Women in the Developing World, 1990–2006." *Politics & Gender* 10 (1): 33–61.
- Antonakis-Nashif, A. 2016. "Contested Transformation: Mobilized Publics in Tunisia Between Compliance and Protest." *Mediterranean Politics* 21 (1): 128–149.
- Arendt, C. M. 2018. "From Critical Mass to Critical Leaders: Unpacking the Political Conditions Behind Gender Quotas in Africa." *Politics & Gender* 14 (3): 295–322.
- Asseburg, M., and H. Wimmen. 2016. "Dynamics of Transformation, Elite Change and New Social Mobilization in the Arab World." *Mediterranean Politics* 21 (1): 1–22.
- Baldez, L. 2003. "Women's Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland." *Comparative Politics* 35 (3): 253–272.
- Barari, H. A. 2015. "The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf." *Middle East Critique* 24 (1): 99–111.
- Bauer, G., and J. E. Burnet. 2013. "Gender Quotas, Democracy, and Women's Representation in Africa: Some Insights from Democratic Botswana and Autocratic Rwanda." *Women's Studies International Forum* 41, November: 103–112.

- Beissinger, M. R., A. A. Jamal, and K. Mazur. 2015. "Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions." *Comparative Politics* 48 (1): 1–24.
- Bennett, A., and J. T. Checkel. 2015. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bereni, L. 2007. "French Feminists Renegotiate Republican Universalism: The Gender Parity Campaign." *French Politics* 5 (3): 191–209.
- Boubakri, H., and A. Bouzidi. 2017. *Tunisian Youth, from Obedience to Protest*. Rome: Sahwa.
- The Carter Center. 2014. *The Constitution-making Process in Tunisia*. Final Report. Atlanta: The Carter Center.
- Celis, K., M. L. Krook, and P. Meier. 2011. "The Rise of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform." *West European Politics* 34 (3): 514–530.
- Charrad, M. M., and A. Zarrugh. 2014. "Equal or Complementary? Women in the New Tunisian Constitution After the Arab Spring." *The Journal of North African Studies* 19 (2): 230–243.
- Collins, N. 2011. "Voices of a Revolution: Conversations with Tunisia's Youth." National Democratic Institute. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADU912.pdf.
- Darhour, H., and D. Dahlerup. 2013. "Sustainable Representation of Women Through Gender Quotas: A Decade's Experience in Morocco." *Women's Studies International Forum* 41, November: 132–142.
- Desrues, T. 2012. "Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation: Social Change, Collective Action and Political Activism." *Mediterranean Politics* 17 (1): 23–40.
- Desrues, T., and S. Kirhlani. 2010. "Dix Ans de Monarchie Exécutive et Citoyenne: Élections, Partis Politiques et Défiante Démocratique." *L'Année Du Maghreb* VI: 325–360.
- European Commission, and UNDP, eds. 2017. "Youth Participation in Electoral Processes. Handbook for Electoral Management Bodies."
- Gerschewski, J. 2013. "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes." *Democratization* 20 (1): 13–38.
- González, M., and T. Desrues. 2018. "Youth Representation Under Authoritarianism: The Process of Quota Adoption in Morocco." Paper presented at workshop on youth, inequality and regime response in the global south, University of Bergen.
- Hegasy, S. 2007. "Young Authority: Quantitative and Qualitative Insights into Youth, Youth Culture, and State Power in Contemporary Morocco." *The Journal of North African Studies* 12 (1): 19–36.
- Hoffman, M., and Amaney Jamal. 2012. "The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities." *Middle East Law and Governance* 4 (1): 168–188.
- Hughes, M. M. 2009. "Armed Conflict, International Linkages, and Women's Parliamentary Representation in Developing Nations." *Social Problems* 56 (1): 174–204.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2016. "Youth Participation in National Parliaments 2016."
- Korany, B., and M. El Sayyad. 2017. *Youth Political Engagement During the Arab Spring: Egypt and Tunisia Compared*. Rome: Sahwa.
- Krook, M. L. 2004. "Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoption." *European Political Science* 3 (3): 59–65.
- Krook, M. L. 2007. "Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (3): 367–394.
- Lucas, R. E. 2014. "Monarchies and Protests in the Arab Uprisings: Path Dependencies or Political Opportunities?" *Journal of Arabian Studies* 4 (2): 195–213.
- Majles ANC. 2013. "Séance plénière: Poursuite du débat général autour du projet de constitution." <http://majles.marsad.tn/fr/chroniques/51d4e0dd7ea2c401d0fb2378>.
- Majles ANC. 2014. "Loi électorale. Points de désaccord." http://majles.marsad.tn/fr/loi_electorale/page_loi_electorale_points_de_desaccord.
- Mohammed VI. 2003. "Discours Du Trône." <http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-du-tr%C3%B4ne>.
- Mohammed VI. 2011. "Discours Du Roi Le 20 Août 2011." <https://www.bladi.net/discours-mohammed-6-20-aout-2011.html>.

- Muriaas, R. L., L. Tønnessen, and V. Wang. 2013. "Exploring the Relationship Between Democratization and Quota Policies in Africa." *Women's Studies International Forum* 41, November: 89–93.
- Muriaas, R. L., and V. Wang. 2012. "Executive Dominance and the Politics of Quota Representation in Uganda." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 50 (2): 309–338.
- Murphy, E. C. 2012. "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure." *Mediterranean Politics* 17 (1): 5–22.
- Netterström, K. L. 2015. "The Islamists' Compromise in Tunisia." *Journal of Democracy* 26 (4): 110–124.
- Perthes, V. 2004. *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Reyes, C. P. 2015. "A Democratic Revolution for Youth: The 'Youth Tithe' as a Doctrine." *Intergenerational Justice Review* 2: 63–64.
- Royaume du Maroc. 2011a. "Constitution 2011." http://www.amb-maroc.fr/constitution/Nouvelle_Constitution_%20Maroc2011.pdf.
- Royaume du Maroc. 2011b. "Loi Électorale Du Maroc." <http://tafra.ma/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Loi-organique-27-11-relaative-%23U00e0-la-chambre-des-repr%23U00e9sentants-3-11-2011.pdf>.
- République Tunisienne. 2011. "Décret-Loi N° 2011-35." <http://www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/jortsrc/2011/2011f/jo0332011.pdf>.
- République Tunisienne. 2014. *Loi Électorale de La Tunisie*.
- Sater, J. N. 2012. "Reserved Seats, Patriarchy, and Patronage in Morocco." In *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, edited by S. Franceschet, M. L. Krook, and J. M. Piscopo, 72–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen. 2015. *Nachwuchsquoten in Parteien Und Parlamenten. Warum Die Mitbestimmung Junger Menschen Durch Quoten Sinnvoll Ist*. Stuttgart: generationengerechtigkeit.de.
- Tajali, M. 2013. "Gender Quota Adoption in Postconflict Contexts: An Analysis of Actors and Factors Involved." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 34 (3): 261–285.
- Thyen, K. 2017. "Promising Democracy, Legitimizing Autocracy? Perceptions of Regime Democraticness among University Students in Morocco." *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 11 (2): 325–347.
- Trantidis, A. 2016. "Is Age a Case for Electoral Quotas? A Benchmark for Affirmative Action in Politics." *Representation* 52 (2–3): 149–161.
- UNDP. 2013. "Enhancing Youth Political Participation Throughout the Electoral Cycle. A Good Practice Guide."
- Varieties of Democracy. "V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index". <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>.
- Welbourne, B. C. 2010. "The Strategic Use of Gender Quotas in the Arab World." Willia and Kathy Hybl Democracy Studies Fellowship Paper.
- Yom, S. L., and F. G. Gause. 2012. "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On." *Journal of Democracy* 23 (4): 74–88.
- Zemni, S. 2015. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." *Mediterranean Politics* 20 (1): 1–17.
- Zerhouni, S., and A. Akesbi. 2016. "Youth Activism in Morocco: Exclusion, Agency and the Search for Inclusion." Working Paper No.15.

Appendix 1. Newspaper articles and Twitter data.

I used the ProQuest database to search for relevant newspaper articles concerning the adoption of youth quotas in Tunisia and Morocco. I limited the search to French speaking newspapers.

Table A1. Search strategy for newspaper articles.

	Tunisia	Morocco
Time frame	11/01/01–14/12/31	11/01/01–11/12/31
Search words	parité AND Tunisie*; “femme* AND Tunisie” “jeune* AND Tunisie OR Maroc”; “quota AND Tunisie OR Maroc”	
Newspapers	AllAfrica.com; L’Expression; Le Monde; L’Orient le Jour; Le Temps/El Menzah	AllAfrica.com; Le Monde; L’Orient le Jour; Le Temps/El Menzah [not searched]
Number of articles analyzed for gender quota	340	
Number of articles analyzed for youth quota	89	31

The Twitter evidence was gathered by using Twitter’s advanced search function. I searched after the terms “quota” AND “jeun*” in the period between 1.1.2011 and 31.12.14. I then filtered the results geographically to only obtain the tweets relating to Tunisia. I relied on Twitter’s translating function in order to also capture tweets in Arabic.

Appendix 2. Interviews

Interviews were held in October and November 2017 in Tunis. It follows the (anonymized) descriptions of interview partners.

Interview 1: male, Tunisian, president of a non-governmental youth association.

Interview 2: female, Western-European, employed by an international development agency and head of a project aiming to motivate female candidates to stand for local elections.

Interview 3: male, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political parties) for a German political foundation.

Interview 4: female, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: women and youth) for a German political foundation.

Interview 5: female, Tunisian, president of a Tunisian governmental research institute focusing on women’s issues.

Interview 6: male, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political parties and international cooperation) for a German political foundation.

Interview 7: female, Tunisian, policy consultant (focus: political participation of women and youth) for a German political foundation.

Interview 8: female, Tunisian, former deputy of the Constitutional Assembly, had a leading position in the Commission for women’s rights.

Appendix 3. Constitutional drafts and debates in the National Constitutional Assembly.

Table A2. Provisions regarding the political representation of women and youth in Tunisian constitutional drafts.

	Women	Youth
First draft (08/12)	<p>10. The state shall protect the rights of women as well as protect family structures and maintain the coherence thereof.</p> <p>28. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof as true partners to men in the building of the nation and as having a role complementary thereto within the family.</p> <p>- The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	-
Second draft (12/12)	<p>5. All citizens, women and men, shall have the same rights and the same duties. They shall be equal before the law without any discrimination.</p> <p>7. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof.</p> <p>37. The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	-
Third draft (04/13)	<p>6. All citizens, women and men, shall have the same rights and the same duties. They shall be equal before the law without any discrimination.</p> <p>11. Women and men shall be associated in the construction of society and the state.</p>	<p>12. Youth are an active force in building the nation. [...]. The state shall advocate establishing favorable conditions for the expression of their capacities and their assumption of responsibilities.</p>
Fourth draft (06/13)	<p>45. The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains thereof. The state shall guarantee the provision of equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities. [...]</p>	<p>12. Youth are an active force in building the nation. [...]. The state shall advocate for youth to assume responsibilities and for enlarging youth's participation in social, economic, cultural, and political development.</p> <p>130. The electoral code shall guarantee the representation of youth in local councils.</p>
Constitution (01/14)	<p>34. [...] The state seeks to guarantee women's representation in elected bodies.</p> <p>46. The state commits to protect women's accrued rights and works to strengthen and develop those rights. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility in all domains. The state works to attain parity between women and men in elected assemblies. [...]</p>	<p>8. Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development.</p> <p>133. The electoral code shall guarantee the representation of youth in local councils.</p>